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A model of "historical memory" is proposed. This model identifies three primary levels of 
organization (the news event, the public narrative, the historical period) and allows  public events 
to be associated with personal information. Three experiments were conducted to evaluate this 
model: a verbal protocol study, a response time study, and a free-association  study. In accordance 
with the model, these studies demonstrated that (a) associations between same-narrative events 
tend to be stronger than other interevent associations, (b) political events are more likely to be 
related to accessible  historical periods than are nonpolitical  events, and (c) public  events are often 
stored with accessible personal information. These studies also indicated that (d) political events 
are more likely  than nonpolitical  events to be embedded  in public narratives and (e) nonpolitical 
events are more likely than political events to be associated with personal information. 
Exposure to news reports is a common, almost inevitable 
part of daily life (Schulz,  1982). Typically, the public events 
described  in news reports are either ignored or rapidly forgot- 
ten (Booth, 1970; N. R. Brown, Rips, & Shevell, 1985; Graber, 
1984; Neuman, 1976). Yet facts about some events, generally 
the  most  important  and  the  most  widely  publicized,  are 
gleaned from news reports and stored in long-term memory 
(Johnson  &  Klingler,  1976;  Warrington  &  Sanders,  1971; 
Warrington & Silberstein,  1970). This catalog of  facts, referred 
to throughout this article  as historical  memory,  has  many 
uses; knowledge of the recent past can affect discourse com- 
prehension (Findahl & Hoijer,  1985; Larsen,  1983), learning 
(Clifton  & Slowiaczek,  1981; Findahl & Hoijer,  1982, 1985; 
Gaziano, 1983; Graber,  1984; Schustack & Anderson,  1979; 
Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien,  1970), problem solving (N. R. 
Brown et al.,  1985; Friedman & Wilkins,  1985; Voss, Greene, 
Post, & Penner,  1983), decision making (Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987; Lewis-Becker & Rice,  1982; Sigelman,  1979), and opin- 
ion formation (Combs & Slovic,  1979; Graber, 1984; Iyengar 
& Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, 1982; MeCombs, 
1981; McCombs & Shaw,  1972). Moreover, because govern- 
ments and politicians often respond to the public's opinions 
(expressed  in surveys) and decisions (expressed  at the polls), 
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the popular conception of public events can play an impor- 
tant, if indirect role in shaping future events. 
My primary aim is to identify the concepts and relations 
that characterize the content and structure of  historical mem- 
ory. This issue is important because complex cognitive tasks 
such as discourse comprehension and problem  solving  are 
affected  by the structure of the relevant knowledge base,  as 
well  as  by the  processes  that  operate  on  those  structures 
(Anderson,  1983; Chi, Glaser,  & Rees,  1982; Collins,  1978; 
Collins & Loftus, 1975; Reiser, Black, & Abelson, 1985). Thus 
a  thorough understanding of the many high-level  activities 
affected  by  knowledge  of the  recent  past  depends  on  an 
empirically valid model of the historical  memory. 
A  model  of historical  memory is  proposed  in  the  next 
section. According  to this model, knowledge of  the recent past 
consists largely of facts about specific public events and the 
relations that hold between those events. In particular, I argue 
that causally  related events often cluster in memory to form 
more or less discrete public narratives. In turn, these  public 
narratives may be  related  to historical periods.  The model 
also acknowledges that a public event may be associated with 
other public events through similarity  and that people may 
encode facts about the contextin which they learned about a 
particular event along with facts about the event itself. This 
model is evaluated in the three experiments to be presented. 
To take a concrete example, consider Lieutenant Colonel 
Oliver North's dismissal  from his position with the National 
Security Council. This event was prompted by the revelation 
that North had played a major role in the Iran-contra affair. 
It was accompanied by the resignation of the National Secu- 
rity Adviser, Admiral John Poindexter, and it set the stage for 
North's dramatic testimony before the Select Congressional 
Committee.  According to  the  current  theory,  facts  about 
North's dismissal  would  be  stored  with  facts  about  other 
related events (the Iranians received three shipments of  TOW 
antiaircraft missiles, one American hostage was released, prof- 
its  from the arms sales were diverted to the Contra rebels 
fighting in Nicaragua, etc.). This set of events is assumed to 
form a  cohesive,  complex unit  in  memory. Because  these 
events took place during President Ronald Reagan's term of 298  NORMAN R.  BROWN 
office, the current theory predicts that people will consider 
the Iran--contra affair to be part of a historical  period defined 
by Reagan's tenure as president.  Finally,  the assumption that 
personal information is often encoded with information about 
public events implies  that people may be reminded of their 
own activities during 1986 and 1987 when they consider the 
Iran-contra affair. 
Narrativelike  structures are not the only ones that could be 
used to organize knowledge of real-world  events.  Indeed, a 
number of researchers  have proposed that real-world  events 
are  organized  around central  concepts,  rather  than embedded 
within narrative  contexts.  For example, Schank and his col- 
leagues (Kolodner, 1983a, 1983b; Lcbowitz, 1983a, 1983b; 
Rciscr, 1983; Rciser  et al.,  1985;  Reiser,  Black,  & Kalamar- 
ides, 1986;  Schank, 1982) have developed a detailed  theory 
in which event categories  serve  the primary organizational 
function.  According to  this  approach, North's  dismissal  would 
be stored  in memory with other  politically  motivated resig- 
nations (c.g.,  those of Andrew  Young,  Cyrus Vance, and 
James Watt),  but it  would be  only  indirectly  (i.e.,  inferentially) 
related to other important Iran--c.ontra events. Others (Clifton 
& Slowiaczek,  1981; Hastie & Kumar,  1979; Srull,  Lichten- 
stein, & Rothbart,  1985; Srull & Wyer, 1989) have proposed 
that  events are  organized around  "person  concepts." In  a 
person-based theory, the events and facts that directly concern 
Oliver North would be subsumed by a single "Oliver North 
node," but,  as with the event-category theory, these  events 
would not be directly associated  with Iran-contra events that 
did not involve North. 
Elements of Historical Memory 
The Basic Unit: The Event 
In the current model, memorable public events are repre- 
sented as unique event units. Each event unit is composed of 
a number of event components that specify the event's basic 
properties--that is, the action that took place,  the identities 
and roles of the participants, the location of the action, and 
perhaps one  or two particularly salient  details  (Findahl  & 
Hoijer,  1975, 1982, 1985; Larsen,  1983). For example,  ac- 
cording to the current theory, the murder of John Lennon 
should  be  represented  by an  event  unit  identifying  Mark 
David Chapman as the murderer,  Lennon as the victim, a 
handgun as the weapon, and New York City as the location. 
Prior  research  in  autobiographical  memory  (Robinson, 
1976; Rubin,  1982; Wagenaar,  1986)  suggests that at  least 
some event components are directly associated  with corre- 
sponding concepts in  semantic memory (Collins  &  Loftus, 
1975). These links serve as retrieval  indices,  allowing access 
to a particular event from a particular concept. Thus if the 
event unit constructed to represent John Lennon's murder 
were directly linked to the specific concept John Lennon and 
to the general  concept murder, this  unit might be  recalled 
when either concept is considered, and it should be recalled 
when both concepts are considered.  Because a concept can be 
associated with a number of different units,  events that share 
components are indirectly related  through their connections 
to their common concepts. Thus the node representing  Len- 
non's murder would be indirectly related to other facts known 
about Lennon through the Lennon node and to other murders 
through the  murder  node.  As this  example  illustrates,  the 
notion of a  multiply indexed event unit encompasses both 
action-based and person-based organizations and also allows 
other classes of information to serve an indexing role. 
Public Events and Public Narratives 
The public events most likely to be remembered are those 
that warrant extensive  media coverage and elicit a great deal 
of public interest  (Booth,  1970; Schulz,  1982). Such events 
rarely occur in isolation.  Rather, they tend to be embedded 
in  a  complex web  of causes and  consequences,  and  these 
causes and consequences often manifest themselves  as other 
well-publicized  events.  For example, the assassination  of Be- 
nigno Aquino in the  summer of 1983 led to the trial  and 
acquittal of General Fabian Ver. This,  in turn, resulted  in a 
series of  massive protests that forced the Philippines  President 
Ferdinand Marcos to call a national election.  Evidence of a 
rigged election led to further protests,  and these protests were 
followed by a military rebellion  headed by Juan Ponce Enrile 
and Fidel  Ramos. Ultimately, this rebellion  resulted  in the 
exile of Mareos and the inauguration of Corazon Aquino as 
president. 
It has been proposed (Larsen,  1983; van Dijk,  1984; van 
Dijk &  Kintsch,  1983) that people form complex memory 
structures from their knowledge of ongoing news stories and 
that these structures are augmented with new information as 
relevant events unfold and are reported in the news media. 
These knowledge structures,  referred  to as public narratives, 
identify the story's major events and capture the causal (and 
the hierarchical)  relations that hold between events that con- 
stitute  the narrative.  There are two primary reasons for hy- 
pothesizing that people construct narrativelike  representations 
to encode their knowledge of recent public events.  First,  it 
appears that newsworthy public events are often unpredicta- 
ble; at the time, who could have imagined that the assassina- 
tion of Benigno Aquino would have led to the inauguration 
of his widow or that the release  of an American hostage  in 
Lebanon was in some way connected to the funding of the 
Nicaraguan rebels? The fact that public events are frequently 
related to one another in unique ways implies that historical 
events will often be difficult, if not impossible,  to reconstruct 
from a  general  knowledge of events  and  event  sequences. 
Prestorage  is the obvious way to overcome this difficulty;  a 
person who explicitly encodes the relations that hold between 
a news story's major events should form an accurate, stable, 
and readily accessible representation of that story. 
The second reason why people may create narrative repre- 
sentations to organize their knowledge of public events is the 
existence of  a general episodic pattern common to news stories 
and fictional narratives.  In both cases, one often finds human 
(or institutional)  agents acting deliberately  to achieve goals 
that conflict with the goals of other agents. It is also common 
to find that actions on the part of one party lead to reactions 
on the  part  of others  (Black  &  Bower,  1980;  Mandler  & ORGANIZATION  OF PUBLIC EVENTS  299 
Johnson,  1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Stein & Glenn, 1979; Tra- 
basso & van den Brock,  1985;  van den Brock & Trabasso, 
1986).  Research  in  story comprehension indicates that the 
interpretation of complex event sequences requires people to 
engage a  causal  inference process (Graesser, Robertson,  & 
Anderson,  1981;  Trabasso, Secco, &  van den Brock,  1984; 
Trabasso &  Sperry,  1985).  This  process,  which  draws  on 
general knowledge,  story knowledge, and naive theories of 
psychology and physical causality, yields an understanding of 
how  a  particular  event  is  related  to  other  events.  People 
encode this understanding by constructing causal links be- 
tween related events and,  in so doing, develop networklike 
story representations (Graesser et al.,  1981; O'Brien & Myers, 
1987; Trabasso et al.,  1984;  Trabasso & Sperry,  1985; Tra- 
basso & van den Brock, 1985). If people use the same infer- 
ence  process to  understand  news  stories  that  they  use  to 
understand conventional stories, they will construct networks 
that link causally related news events to one another. More- 
over, the process of constructing public narratives should be 
facilitated by the journalistic practice of  including background 
material in  the  bodies of most news  reports.  This  should 
remind (or inform) the reader of the prior events that are 
necessary to understand  and encode a  news report's main 
event as a narrative episode. 
Also, a  growing body of research indicates that autobio- 
graphical events may be organized in narrativelike structures 
(Barsalou, 1988; Bradburn, Rips, & Shevell, 1987; Fitzgerald, 
1980;  Huttenlocher,  Hedges,  &  Bradburn,  1990;  Linton, 
1986; Reiser, 1983; Reiser et al., 1986; Wagenaar, 1986; Wyer, 
Shoben,  Fuhrman,  &  Bodenhausen,  1985).  There  is  also 
evidence that jurors  attempt to  construct  narratives from 
courtroom  testimony (Pennington  &  Hastie,  1986,  t988). 
This work is important because it provides a clear demonstra- 
tion  that  people  are  capable  of perceiving  and  encoding 
connections between causally related events, even when those 
events are separated in  time and  encountered outside of a 
conventional story format. 
Historical Periods 
The most general level of  organization in historical memory 
is that of the historical period.  The notion  of a  historical 
period  is  intended  to  capture  the  intuition  that  historical 
events cluster both thematically and temporally in the same 
way that  personal  events  do  (Conway &  Bekerian,  1987; 
Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prohaska, 1988; Linton,  1986; Re- 
iser,  1983; Reiser et al., 1985; Robinson, 1986). It is assumed 
that historical periods exist as distinct memory units and are 
defined by a small set of temporal and thematic features. For 
an event or narrative to be part of a particular period, it must 
have happened during the temporal range specified by the 
period, and it must share a number of the period's defining 
features. The relationship between period and period member 
may be prestored or readily inferred from the content of the 
member. This definition leaves open the possibility that peo- 
ple maintain many temporally overlapping public and per- 
sonal periods. 
In the  experiments to be described, public periods were 
identified with the terms of U.S. presidents for two reasons: 
First, within the sphere of U.S. politics and foreign policy, 
presidents and their administrations play an active and direct 
role in most important events. Even those international events 
that do not have an immediate effect on the interests of the 
United States often elicit a concrete and memorable response 
from the administration. Because of  this, people should often 
be able to access a  political event's historical (presidential) 
period by identifying the public figures who participated in 
that event or in other closely related events. 
The second reason to equate historical periods with presi- 
dential administrations is a practical one. Most of the univer- 
sity students who participated in my experiments were born 
in the  1960s. In order to ensure that these subjects were old 
enough to have learned about the events when they happened, 
it was necessary to restrict the set of events to those that took 
place from  1976 to  1984.  This 8-year period seems to have 
lacked the major social and political upheavals that may have 
defined public periods in other decades (e.g., the Depression, 
World War II). As a result, the presidential administrations 
may be the only element unifying national and international 
affairs. 
There are,  of course,  events such  as the  Bhopal,  India, 
chemical disaster or the  death  of Cary Grant that  do  not 
directly involve the federal government or elicit a well-publi- 
cized  governmental response.  Because  such  events  can  be 
understood without reference to the current political context, 
there should be little reason or opportunity for people to relate 
these  events  to  a  public  period  defined  by a  presidential 
administration. However, such events may be related to per- 
sonal periods or to public periods defined by other sorts of 
features. 
Public Events and Autobiographical Events 
Up to this point, the discussion of historical memory has 
focused on how people organize their knowledge of contem- 
porary history. One important aspect of historical knowledge 
is clearly its public or shared nature, but there also is a personal 
side  to this knowledge.  In general,  historical  knowledge  is 
acquired secondhand:  People learn about current events by 
reading stories in  the  newspaper, by listening to them  on 
radio, by viewing them on television, or through discussions 
with other people (Roberts & Bachen, 1981). When one learns 
about or discusses a public event, one is engaged in a personal 
activity, and such activities can be treated as distinct events 
and stored as unique autobiographical memories. According 
to the  model,  memory traces  may be laid  down  by these 
"informative events." These traces are seen as a composite of 
public and autobiographic information, whereby a news sto- 
ry's factual content serves as the trace's "focal element," and 
its environmental,  social, and affective context serve as its 
"setting" (Tulving"  1983).  Put more simply, the  model as- 
sumes that there  are contextual links that directly connect 
facts derived from news stories to facts about the personal 
context in which they were acquired or used.  It is through 
these links that the contemporaneous but generally distinct 
domains of autobiographical memory and historical memory 
are coordinated (Neisser, 1982). 300  NORMAN R.  BROWN 
Research on  "flashbulb  memories" (R.  Brown &  Kulik, 
1977; McCloskey,  Wible,  &  Cohen,  1988; Pillemer,  1984; 
Winograd & Killinger,  1982; Yarmey & Bull,  1978) provides 
strong evidence that people do store contextual facts  when 
they encode information for some public events. These studies 
have demonstrated that people can recall, in vivid detail,  the 
circumstances in which they first learned about particularly 
surprising  or important public events (e.g., the assassination 
of John  F.  Kennedy).  Two  date-estimation  experiments 
(Friedman & Wilkins,  1985; Lieury, Aiello, Lepreux, & Mel- 
let, 1980) provided further evidence for this position. In these 
studies, people were asked to write down the information that 
came to mind as they estimated dates for well-known public 
events. In both experiments,  subjects frequently reported au- 
tobiographical events or facts. This indicates that people make 
use  of the  hypothesized link  between  personal  and  public 
knowledge even when the task does not explicitly call for the 
retrieval of the autobiographical information. 
Summary 
The model presented in this section has identified  a number 
of concepts that may characterize the content and structure 
of historical  memory. The starting point of this model is the 
contention that much of  people's knowledge of  contemporary 
history concerns specific, well-publicized events. The memory 
units constructed to represent these  events are embedded in 
a  rich  network  of associations.  This  network  has  both  a 
hierarchical  aspect (Linton,  1986; Neisser,  1986) and a non- 
hierarchical  aspect.  The hierarchical  aspect of the model is 
portrayed in Figure 1. Here, the individual events that make 
up the content of an  ongoing news  story (e.g., the Aquino 
revolution)  are  drawn  together  to  form  a  distinct  public 
narrative,  and events and narratives that share certain tem- 
poral and thematic features are related to common historical 
periods (e.g., the Reagan years). 
Event units themselves  can be associated  in a  number of 
ways.  First,  an event unit  may be directly associated  with 
other event units by means of causal links. "Same-narrative" 
events  may also  be  indirectly  related  through  a  common 
higher  order  narrative  node  and  through  links  to  shared 
concepts. Events that are not members of the same narrative 
generally  are  not directly linked to one another.  However, 
they  may  be  indirectly  linked  when  they  share  common 
concepts or when they are subsumed by the same historical 
period. Finally, the model allows for the possibility that people 
form  associations  between  specific  public  events  and  the 
personal contexts in which those events were encountered. 
Experiment  1 
The model of historical  memory described  in the last sec- 
tion  presupposes  that people construct memory units to en- 
code their knowledge of public events,  that these  units are 
embedded in  a  rich  network of associations,  and that this 
network has systematic properties (i.e., event units are fre- 
quently associated  with some types of information, but not 
with  others).  One way to evaluate this  sort of model is to 
present subjects  with a  set of public events and have them 
think out loud as they perform a task that requires them to 
make extensive use of  their historical  knowledge but does not 
necessarily  favor one type of knowledge over another.  The 
Carter's  I  Reagan's  [ 
Presidency  Presidency 
/  \  % 
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Figure 1.  A simplified fragment of historical memory illustrating the relations between historical 
periods, public narratives, event units, and personal contexts. (The unbroken lines indicate an associative 
relation between units, and the dashed lines indicate either an associative or inferred relation.) ORGANIZATION  OF PUBLIC EVENTS  301 
facts contained in these verbal protocols can then be classified, 
and the relative frequency of these classes can be taken as an 
index of the frequency with which event units are associated 
with different types of information. 
In keeping with this rationale,  subjects in  Experiment  1 
thought aloud as they estimated dates for recent public events. 
This particular task was selected because it seemed likely to 
elicit an open-ended but  representative sample of current- 
event  knowledge.  This  expectation was  based  on  research 
indicating that dates are typically "reconstructed" rather than 
recalled  (Baddeley,  Lewis,  &  Nimmo-Smith,  1978;  N.  R. 
Brown  et  al.,  1985;  Ferguson  &  Martin,  1983;  Friedman, 
1987; Friedman & Wilkins,  1985; Linton,  1975; Means, Ni- 
gam, Zarrow, Loftus, & Donaldson,  1989; Thompson, 1982; 
Thompson, Skowronski, & Lee, 1987). When reconstructing 
dates, people retrieve facts from memory and draw "temporal 
inferences" (Collins, 1978). These inferences help narrow the 
range of years or the time of year during which a target event 
could have occurred.  For example, a  person attempting to 
date the overthrow of the Shah of Iran might recall that this 
event happened during Jimmy Carter's presidency. This fact, 
combined with the knowledge that Carter held office from 
1977  to  1981,  implies that the shah must have been over- 
thrown during this period. 
The reconstructive process involved in date estimation and 
in other knowledge-based problem-solving tasks consists of a 
cycle  of retrieval  and  inference  (Collins,  1978;  Collins  & 
Michalski, 1989; Norman & Bobrow, 1979; Williams & Hol- 
lan,  1981).  In  date  estimation,  the  reconstructive  process 
begins with accessing the target event. Then a fact related to 
the event is retrieved and evaluated. If the retrieved fact is 
temporally informative, its implications are derived, and an 
inferred temporal range  is  updated.  Otherwise,  the  fact is 
discarded, the target event is reaccessed, and another fact is 
retrieved. Typically, a single fact, short of  the event's calendar 
date, will not provide enough information to allow a person 
to infer an event's precise date. As a result, this cycle may be 
repeated many times, terminating when a  precise date has 
been inferred, when a time limit has been reached, or when 
all readily available facts have been evaluated. It is possible 
that date reconstruction is begun  only when people fail to 
recover a calendar date for the target event. However, because 
explicitly encoded dates are rare (N. R. Brown et al.,  1985; 
Underwood,  1977),  date reconstruction should be common 
(Baddeley et al., 1978; Friedman, 1987; Friedman & Willdns, 
1985; Means et al.,  1989; Thompson et al., 1987). Therefore, 
protocols collected in this experiment should frequently con- 
tain one or more supporting facts. 
The facts contained in dating protocols were used as evi- 
dence concerning the organization of public events in long- 
term memory. This somewhat unorthodox treatment of pro- 
tocol data (cf.  Ericsson &  Simon,  1980)  is justified on the 
following grounds. First, it is assumed that an opportunistic 
retrieval process supports date reconstruction--that is, that 
the retrieval process recovers those facts that are most readily 
available, regardless of their content  (Collins &  Michalski, 
1989; Kintsch,  1988; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981). Second, 
it  is  assumed  that  the  availability  of a  given  fact  at  the 
beginning of a  retrieval cycle is determined, in part, by the 
strength of the association between that fact and the target 
event. This implies that retrieved facts will often be highly 
associated with the target event. Finally, it is assumed that 
event units  are  embedded  in  an  associative network with 
systematic properties. It follows that the facts mentioned in 
the protocols should reflect those systematic properties. Thus 
an accurate model of historical memory should predict the 
types of facts that people will retrieve when they reconstruct 
dates for public events. 
One of the central assumptions of the current model was 
that weU-known public events are often embedded in narra- 
tive frameworks. This implies that associations between events 
subsumed by the  same narrative should be stronger,  more 
common,  and  more direct  than  other types of interevent 
associations; that  is,  associations that  might exist between 
similar but causally unrelated events. If  this is correct, events 
belonging to the target event's narrative should be recalled 
more often than other types of public events. 
Another contention made earlier was that facts about public 
events are often stored with information about the personal 
context in which those facts were learned or used.  Personal 
information should be useful to the dating process because it 
would  allow subjects to tie the  target event to a  personal 
chronology composed of a relatively detailed and well-struc- 
tured set of temporal facts (Friedman & Wilkins,  1985; Hut- 
tenlocher et al., 1988; Lieury et al.,  1980; Linton, 1975; Loftus 
& Marburger,  1985; Reiser, 1983; Reiser et al.,  1986; Robin- 
son,  1986).  Because personal facts should  be useful to the 
dating process, and because they are assumed to be fairly 
common, one would expect them to show up frequently in 
dating protocols. 
Historical periods were a third aspect of  the proposed model 
investigated in Experiment 1. As mentioned earlier, contem- 
porary  historical  periods  were  identified  with  presidential 
terms. Public events that directly or indirectly involved the 
federal  government  were  expected  to  be  related  to  these 
presidential periods, whereas public events that did not in- 
volve the  federal government were  not.  In order to  assess 
these expectations, two types of items were included in this 
experiment. Half of the events that the subjects dated were 
political events,  such as the invasion of Afghanistan or the 
resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and half were 
nonpolitical events, such as the Jonestown suicides or the first 
Mount St. Helens eruption. The prediction was that subjects 
would make more frequent reference to presidential periods 
when dating political events than when dating nonpolitical 
events because presidential information should be more avail- 
able for the former than for the latter. 
One final point concerns dating performance. Typically, 
when subjects date real-world events, there is a strong corre- 
lation  between true  dates and estimated dates,  a  relatively 
small average absolute error, and a relatively small proportion 
of "correct" responses--that is, responses in which the year 
and the month when the target event occurred are correOdy 
identified (N. R. Brown et al., 1985; Underwood,  1977). It is 
also common to find that accuracy reflects the age and the 
salience of the events being tested (Baddeley et al.,  1978; N. 
R. Brown et al.,  1985;  Friedman & Willdns,  1985; Hutten- 
locher et al.,  1988,  1990;  Linton,  1975;  Thompson,  1982); 302  NORMAN  R.  BROWN 
other things being equal, recent events are dated more accu- 
rately  than  older events,  and  well-known  events  are  dated 
more accurately than  obscure events.  If the requirement to 
verbalize does not affect the dating process, dating perform- 
ance in this study should follow this general pattern. 
Method 
Materials.  The 32 news events that served as target items in this 
experiment (see Table 1) included 8 events from each year between 
1978 and  1981. Half of the events selected were political in nature, 
and  half were nonpolitical. The political events included  national 
events that directly or indirectly involved the federal government and 
international events of a  political or military nature.  Nonpolitical 
events had no obvious relation to national or international affairs. 
Events were selected so that event age and prior level of knowledge 
balanced  across  event type.  On  average,  the  political events had 
occurred 3.26 years before the time when this experiment was con- 
ducted, and the nonpolitical events had occurred 3.30 years before. 
A group of pilot subjects gave the political events a mean knowledge 
rating of 5.30 on a  scale of 0 (no knowledge) to 9 (a great deal of 
knowledge). The  nonpolitical  events  received a  mean  knowledge 
rating of 5.23. 
Table  1 
Event Descriptions  Used in Experiment 1 
Date  Event 
March 1978 
September 1978 
October 1978 
October 1978 
January 1979 
June 1979 
August 1979 
December 1979 
April 1980 
July 1980 
September 1980 
September 1980 
May 1981 
August 1981 
October i 981 
December 1981 
Political events 
U.S. signs Panama Canal Treaty. 
Camp David Peace Accord signed. 
Congress extends the ERA deadline. 
Sadat and Begin win the Nobel Prize. 
Khomeini overthrows the Shah of Iran. 
U.S. and Soviets sign SALT agreement. 
Andrew Young leaves U.N. post. 
Soviets invade Afghanistan. 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigns. 
U.S. boycotts the Moscow Olympics. 
U.S. sells AWACs to Saudis. 
Iraq initiates Iranian War. 
Frangois  Mitterrand  becomes  French  Pre- 
mier. 
U.S. downs two Libyan jets. 
Anwar Sadat assassinated. 
Martial law declared in Poland. 
April 1978 
June 1978 
July 1978 
November 1978 
March 1979 
July 1979 
October 1979 
December 1979 
January 1980 
March 1980 
November 1980 
December 1980 
April 1981 
July 1981 
July 1981 
January 1982 
Nonpolitical events 
"Holocaust" aired for the first time. 
"Son of Sam" convicted. 
First test-tube baby born in England. 
911 die in Jonestown suicides. 
Three Mile Island Accident occurs. 
Skylab falls from orbit. 
Mother Theresa wins Nobel Prize. 
Eleven fans die at the "Who" concert. 
Paul MeCartney arrested by Japanese police. 
First Mount St. Helens eruption. 
80 die in I_as Vegas hotel fire. 
John  Lennon  murdered  by  Mark  David 
Chapman. 
First Space Shuttle launched. 
Prince Charles marries Diana Spencer. 
125 people die in Kansas City Hyatt disaster. 
AT&T forced to break up. 
Procedure.  At the beginning of the session, subjects were told that 
the descriptions they would be seeing referred to unique events that 
happened  between  January  1976  and  "the  present"  (May  1983). 
Subjects were asked to estimate the month and year during which 
each event took place and to  make an educated guess when they 
could not come up with a precise answer. Subjects were also instructed 
to think out loud as they decided on a reasonable estimate and were 
told that they would be prompted if they fell silent for more than a 
few seconds. Beyond this prompting, subjects received no feedback. 
Each subject received a booklet in which the descriptions of  the events 
were typed, one to a page, and the events were randomized separately 
for each subject. 
Before subjects were presented with the experimental events, they 
were given six practice trials.  The procedure for the practice events 
was the same as that for the experimental events, except that subjects 
were prompted more often. The responses to both the practice events 
and the experimental events were tape-recorded, and the responses 
to the experimental events were transcribed. 
When the subjects completed the protocol phase of  the experiment, 
they  received a  knowledge  rating  form  containing  the  32  event 
descriptions, printed in a  random  order, 8 to a  page. The subjects 
were instructed to indicate how much they knew about each event 
on a scale of 0 (no knowledge of the event in question) to 9 (a great 
deal of knowledge). 
Subjects.  Fifteen  subjects  participated  in  this  study.  All  were 
recruited from the University of Chicago community by an adver- 
tisement in the university paper, and their ages ranged from 23 to 30. 
Subjects were tested individually in sessions that lasted 30-50 min, 
and they were paid $3.50 for their participation. 
Results 
Dating performance  and knowledge  ratings.  As in  prior 
studies (e.g., N. R. Brown et al., 1985; Linton,  1975; Thomp- 
son,  1982;  Underwood,  1977),  the  protocol  subjects  rarely 
responded with both the correct month and the correct year; 
such accurate responses occurred only 8% of  the time. Despite 
the low hit  rate,  dating  performance  was  quite  good; there 
was a  strong correlation (.83, p  <  .001) between the events' 
true  dates  and  their  mean  estimated  dates,  and  the  mean 
absolute error was fairly small (.98 of a year). There were also 
strong  correlations  between  the  knowledge  ratings  and  the 
mean absolute  error (-.56, p  <  .001)  and between the true 
dates and the absolute error (-.62, p  <  .001).  Event type had 
no effect on dating accuracy or knowledge ratings. For polit- 
ical events, the mean absolute error was .97 of a year, and the 
mean knowledge rating was 3.80. For nonpolitical events, the 
means were  1.00  of a  year and  3.49  for absolute  error and 
knowledge, respectively. These differences yielded Fs of less 
than  1.0 for both  subjects  and  items when the means were 
submitted to the appropriate analyses of variance (ANOVAS). 
Protocol analysis.  Each protocol response was coded for 
the presence of the following information: (a) specific temporal 
facts, which  contained  information  about  the target  event's 
duration  or age but  not its exact date; (b) general temporal 
facts, which allowed subjects to infer some aspect of the target 
event's temporal character from the fact that it is an event of 
a  certain  type;  (c) presidential references; (d)  references  to 
public events that were members of  the target event's narrative 
(i.e.,  same-narrative  events); (e)  references  to  public  events 
that  were  not  members  of the target  event's narrative  (i.e., 
nonnarrative  events);  and  (f) contextual information,  which ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC  EVENTS  303 
included references to autobiographical events and facts, as 
well as references to specific news reports. Responses contain- 
ing samples of each of the reference types are presented in 
Table 2. The second, third, and fifth examples illustrate that 
although these six response categories were mutually exclu- 
sive, a  given response may have included facts from more 
than one of them. As a check on the reliability of this coding 
scheme, a naive judge reseored 60 responses (4 per subject). 
For this sample, the judge and I agreed 92% of the time on 
response coding. 
Four predictions were made concerning  the contents of the 
dating protocols. The first was that subjects would frequently 
justify their responses with reference to one or more auxiliary 
facts. In order to evaluate this prediction, each response was 
classified as being either justified or unjustified.  A  response 
was considered to be justified when the subject mentioned 
information that fell into at  least one of the six reference 
categories, Responses that did not include such information 
were considered to be unjustified (see Table 2, Example 7). 
As predicted, justified responses (78%) vastly outnumbered 
Table 2 
Protocols Containing Examples of the Reference Types Coded in Experiment 1 
Target event  Response 
Specific temporal knowledge 
"Congress Extends ERA Deadline"  That was three years before last June.... So, it would have 
been about June of'79. 
"Sadat and Begin Win the Nobel 
Prize" 
General temporal knowledge 
Sadat and Begin must have won the Nobel prize before 
Sadat's death and after Camp David. Taking the aver- 
age, I would say probably 1978. I assume the Nobel 
Prize is announced in the winter because it "s sort of an 
August kind of  thing. Summer's too frivolous. October 
of 1978. 
"Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
Resigns" 
Presidential reference 
That was in the Carter administration. So it had to be 
between the periods of 1977 to '81. And it was fairly far 
along in his administration,  as well, ifI recall. I think 
that it was in the last year of his administration,  during 
the Iran situation. I would think for that reason, and I 
also seem to recall that this event happened around the 
middle of the year;, maybe May or June. So I would say 
May of 1980. 
"Khomeini Overthrows the Shah 
of Iran" 
Same-narrative event 
So, l'm trying to remember when the...the embassy was 
overtaken .... I know that, let's see, the hostages  were 
released...the, right at the beginning  of'81. 
About...November of '79. 
"Iraq Initiates Iranian War" 
Nonnarrative  event 
Let's see. I think, that was, I was traveling in Europe, and 
that was...about a year ago, in June, that they bombed 
the nuclear reactor in Iraq. Somebody bombed, no the, 
the Israelis...well,  it was about the same time anyway. 
So I'd say June of 1982. 
"Space Shuttle Launched" 
Contextual and autobiographical information 
I was sitting in a barber shop when that happened,  watch- 
ing it, and I was living in another locale. That was 
before I moved out here, which was in September of "80 
that I moved out here. So I would say it would have 
been in June of 1980 because I seem to recall it was a 
couple months before that, and it was warm, I was 
wearing a short-sleeved shirt at the time. 
"U.S. Downs Two Libyan Jets" 
Unjustified response 
Trying to...I'm just trying to place this thing...and I can't 
exactly. Seems to me that I should be able to, but I 
can't  .... So I would say...that this happened...in the 
middle of 1980. So, I'll say April of 1980. 
Note.  Italicized statements indicate the portion of the response relevant to the reference type classification. 304  NORMAN R.  BROWN 
unjustified responses (22%);  14 of 15 subjects provided justi- 
fications for the majority of their responses (p <  .01).  (All 
confidence levels reported in this section are based on two- 
tailed sign tests.) This pattern held across event type; 82% of 
the political responses and 73% of the nonpolitical responses 
were justified. 
The three  other predictions  concern the  contents of the 
justified responses. Data relevant to these predictions are listed 
in Table 3. The entries in this table represent the proportion 
of responses  that  included  one  or  more  facts  of a  given 
reference type. The first prediction for the justified responses 
was that references to same-narrative events should be more 
common than references to other sorts of public events. As 
predicted,  subjects mentioned  same-narrative  events  (21%) 
more often than they mentioned nonnarrative events (13%; 
p  <  .01).  A  second prediction  was that subjects would  fre- 
quently  use  contextual  information  to  support  their  date 
estimates.  The  results  listed  in  Table  3  indicate  that  this 
prediction was also correct; 48% of the responses included at 
least one contextual fact, and so contextual information was 
by far the most common response category. Of 14 subjects, 
12 mentioned contextual information more often than any 
other type of information (p <  .05).  The final prediction was 
that political events would elicit more presidential references 
than would nonpolitical events. Again, the prediction proved 
to be correct; presidential  references appeared in 35% of the 
political responses events and in only 4% of the nonpolitical 
responses. Fourteen subjects displayed this pattern (p <  .01). 
Not only did event type affect the frequency of presidential 
references;  it also affected the  frequency with  which  same- 
narrative events and contextual facts were retrieved. Subjects 
retrieved same-narrative events more often when dating po- 
litical events (32%) than when dating nonpolitical events (9%; 
p  <  .01).  In contrast,  they retrieved  more contextual infor- 
mation when they dated nonpolitical events (59%) than when 
they dated political events (38 %; p <  .01). 
Discussion 
To  summarize,  verbal  protocols were  collected  from  15 
subjects as they estimated dates for 32 public events. Overall, 
the estimates were reasonably good, but not perfect; that is, 
although there was a strong correlation between true date and 
mean estimated date, subjects rarely provided responses that 
included both the correct month and the correct year. These 
Table 3 
Proportion of  Responses Including at Least One Fact of  a 
Given Reference Type in Experiment  1 
Event type 
Reference category  Political  Nonpolitical  M 
Contextual  .37  .59  .48 
Presidential  .35  .04  .19 
Same-narrative event  .32  .09  .21 
Nonnarrative  event  .12  .13  .13 
Specific temporal facts  .07  .08  .07 
General temporal facts  .05  .05  .05 
findings are consistent with  those  observed in  prior event- 
dating experiments (e.g.,  N.  R.  Brown et al.,  1985; Under- 
wood, 1977) and indicate that thinking aloud did not interfere 
with subjects' ability to perform the dating task.  Moreover, 
subjects in this experiment mentioned auxiliary facts in most 
of their responses (78%).  This too is consistent with earlier 
findings (e.g.,  Baddeley et al.,  1978; Friedman,  1987; Fried- 
man & Wilkins,  1985; Thompson et al.,  1987) and provides 
additional  evidence that  people  often reconstruct  dates  for 
real-world events. 
A  content analysis performed on the protocols addressed 
several aspects of the proposed model of historical memory. 
First, the assumption that interevent associations are dictated 
primarily  by the  narrative  relations  was  supported  by the 
finding that subjects referred to same-narrative events more 
often than they referred to nonnarrative events. Second, the 
assumption  that  events  are  often encoded  with  contextual 
information  was  supported  by the  large  proportion  of re- 
sponses that included autobiographical facts. Finally, the find- 
ing that presidential  references were common when subjects 
dated political events and uncommon whey they dated non- 
political  events  supports  the  notion  that  historical  periods 
exist as units in memory and that they are readily accessible 
from some events but not from others. 
The content analysis also revealed that event type affected 
the retrieval  of same-narrative  events and contextual infor- 
mation; political events elicited more same-narrative events 
than did nonpolitical events, and nonpolitical events elicited 
more contextual information than did political events. These 
findings suggest that (a) political events are more likely to be 
episodes in  ongoing public  narratives  than  are  nonpolitical 
events and (b) personal information is more likely to be stored 
with nonpolitical events than with political events. In retro- 
spect, the first of these conclusions seems quite  reasonable. 
This is because events classified as political (wars, elections, 
negotiations, etc.) tend to involve two or more goal-directed 
parties in an adversarial relation. In such situations, an action 
initiated  by one  party often  provokes a  reaction  from the 
other. As a result, well-publicized political events often result 
from and  result  in  other equally well-publicized  events.  In 
contrast, well-publicized nonpolitical events seem to stand in 
isolation. Even when an event such as the Three Mile Island 
accident or the Kansas City Hyatt disaster results in a number 
of follow-up events (i.e.,  investigations, lawsuits),  these sub- 
sequent  happenings  are  rarely  given  the  same  amount  of 
media attention as the events that initiated them. This ques- 
tion of event type and narrative  membership is considered 
further in Experiment 3. 
The  finding  that  event  type  influences  the  retrieval  of 
personal information is more problematic.  One explanation 
is that  nonpolitical  events are more likely to be associated 
with  retrievable  contextual  information  than  are  political 
events. Thus the observed difference in the retrieval of con- 
textual facts directly reflects an underlying difference in the 
availability of contextual information. There is, however, an 
alternative explanation: It might be that political events and 
nonpolitical  events  are just  as  likely  to  be  encoded  with 
retrievable personal information, but that political events are 
more likely to be associated with retrievable public informa- ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC EVENTS  305 
tion.  Under  these  conditions,  subjects  should  recall  more 
personal information when they date nonpolitical events be- 
cause they have access to fewer potentially useful public facts. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, subjects retrieved contextual information 
more often when they dated nonpolitical events than when 
they dated political events. Two explanations were offered for 
this finding. According to the first, this difference reflects an 
underlying difference  in  the  probability that  political and 
nonpolitical events are stored with retrievable personal infor- 
mation.  In  contrast,  the  second  explanation  assumes  that 
event  type does  not  affect  the  likelihood that  people will 
encode and retain contextual information. According to this 
view,  the  observed  difference  is  attributed  to  the  greater 
number of public facts associated, with political events. Ex- 
periment 2  was  designed to  distinguish between these two 
explanations. 
In this experiment,  subjects were  timed as they decided 
whether a target event occurred during the earlier or the later 
of  two consecutive temporal periods. The experimental design 
included two  types of periods, personal periods  (the  years 
during which the subjects were in high school vs. the years 
during which  they were in college) and public periods (the 
years of Carter's presidency vs. the years of Reagan's presi- 
dency), and two types of events, political and nonpolitical. All 
of the students who  participated in this study had entered 
college in the fall of 1980 and were seniors when the experi- 
ment took place in the spring of 1984. Because Reagan entered 
office in  January  1981,  the  temporal  overlap between  the 
personal periods and the public periods was almost perfect. 
Thus this experiment provided data on the speed with which 
subjects located political and nonpolitical events in the con- 
text  of equivalent personally defined and  publicly defined 
periods. 
The period-membership task was used to test two predic- 
tions. The first prediction was that the nonpolitical-personal 
trials would be performed faster than the political-personal 
trials. In other words, it would be easier for subjects to select 
the  correct  personally defined  period  (i.e.,  high  school  or 
college) when they were presented a nonpolitical event, such 
as the Jonestown  suicides, than when  they are presented a 
political event,  such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
This result would indicate that contextual information is more 
readily available for  nonpolitical  events  than  for  political 
events. The second prediction was that subjects would per- 
form  faster  in  political-public trials than  in  nonpolitical- 
public trials. In  other words,  responses to  political events, 
such  as the invasion of Afghanistan, should be  faster than 
responses to nonpolitical events, such as the Jonestown sui- 
cides, when  the periods are identified with presidents. This 
result would indicate that subjects associated facts related to 
presidential periods more  often  with  political events  than 
nonpolitical events. This prediction of an interaction between 
type of event and type of period is based on the assumption 
that the pattern of retrieval observed in Experiment  1 accu- 
rately reflected the underlying organization of  historical mem- 
ory. 
Method 
Materials and design.  Forty public events were chosen to serve 
as target items in this study. Half of these items were political events, 
and half  were nonpolitical events. Within each event type, half of the 
events took place between March  1978 and March  1980, and the 
other half  occurred between March 1981 and December 1982. Target 
events were  selected so that event age and prior event knowledge 
balanced across event type, and event descriptions were composed so 
as to balance mean word length and mean word frequency across 
event type (see Table 4). 
Over the course of an experimental session, subjects saw the 40 
event descriptions four times, once in each of four 40-trial blocks. In 
half of these trials, the target events appeared in conjunction with a 
pair of public periods, and in the other half, in conjunction with a 
pair of personal periods. In a public period trial, the target event was 
Table 4 
Event Descriptions in Experiment 2 
Date  Event 
March 1978 
September 1978 
February 1979 
February 1979 
June 1979 
August 1979 
November 1979 
December 1979 
January 1980 
April 1980 
March 1981 
June 1981 
August 1981 
October 1981 
December 1981 
December 1981 
January 1982 
April 1982 
June 1982 
July 1982 
Political events 
U.S. signs Panama Canal Treaty. 
The Camp David Peace Accord signed. 
Ayatollah Khomeini takes over Iran. 
Thatcher first becomes Prime Minister. 
U.S. and Soviets sign SALT If. 
Andrew Young resigns. 
Iranian "students" take American embassy. 
Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. 
U.S. halts grain sales  to Soviets. 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigns post. 
American military advisors arrive in E1 Sal- 
vador. 
Francois Mitten'and elected Premier. 
Sandra Day O'Connor  named  to  Supreme 
Court. 
President Anwar Sadat assassinated in Egypt. 
Polish government declares martial law. 
Red Brigade kidnaps General Dozier in Italy. 
Government forces AT&T to divide holdings. 
Argentina captures the Falklands. 
Israeli army invades southern Lebanon. 
George Shultz becomes Secretary of State. 
October 1978 
November 1978 
March 1979 
March 1979 
May 1979 
July 1979 
October 1979 
November 1979 
February 1980 
March 1980 
April 1981 
May 1981 
June 1981 
July 1981 
July 1981 
July 1981 
March 1982 
March 1982 
September 1982 
December 1982 
Nonpolitical events 
John Paul II becomes Pope. 
911 people die in Jonestown suicides. 
The Three Mile Island Accident occurs. 
Jane Byrne elected Mayor of Chicago. 
275 die in Chicago DC-10 crash. 
Skylab falls to Earth. 
Pope John Paul visits the U.S. 
Eleven die at a "Who" concert. 
John Gacy found guilty of murder. 
The first Mount St. Helens eruption occurs. 
First Space Shuttle launched. 
Pope John Paul wounded in Rome. 
Mark David Chapman convicted of Lennon's 
murder. 
Prince Charles marries Diana Spencer 
125 die in Kansas City Hyatt disaster. 
Professional baseball players end strike. 
"Chariots of Fire" wins the Academy Award. 
John Belushi dies. 
Seven people die in Tylenol murders. 
First artificial heart transplanted successfully. 306  NORMAN  R.  BROWN 
presented on one line of a  computer-controlled visual display, and 
the words Carter and Reagan were presented two lines beneath. In 
these trials, subjects had to decide whether the target event happened 
while President Carter was in office (January 1977 to January 1981) 
or  while  President  Reagan  was  in  office  (January  1981  to  "the 
present"--Mareh and April 1984). In personal period trials, the words 
high school and college appeared on the screen beneath the target 
event.  In  these  trials,  subjects were  to  decide  whether the  event 
happened during their high school years or their college years. High 
school was defined as the period that spanned from the beginning of 
ninth grade until the beginning of college. College was defined as the 
period that began when subjects entered their first year in college and 
ended with "the present." 
Period type was blocked so that subjects saw the events in con- 
junction with one type of period during the first half  of the experiment 
(i.e.,  during the first two blocks) and in conjunction with the other 
type of period during the second half. Period order was counterbal- 
anced over subjects so that half of the subjects saw personal periods 
during the first 80 trials, and half saw public periods during the first 
80 trials. The presentation order of events was randomized separately 
for each subject and for each 40-item block. For Blocks l  and 3, the 
left-fight ordering of periods changed randomly with the constraint 
that periods appeared equally often on both sides of the screen for 
each event type. For a given pairing of event with period type, if the 
earlier period  was  on  the  left side  of the  screen  during the  first 
presentation, it appeared on the right during the second. 
Procedure.  In each trial in this experiment, a  target event (e.g., 
Soviet Union invades Afghanistan) and two temporal periods (e.g., 
Carter's and  Reagan's presidencies) were  presented.  Subjects were 
instructed to select, as quickly and as accurately as they could, the 
period during which the target event occurred. A bonus scheme was 
instituted  to  encourage  such  responses.  At  the  beginning of the 
experiment,  subjects  were  guaranteed  their base  pay  ($4  for  the 
session) and were told that they could earn a bonus by being fast and 
accurate. Under this scheme, subjects were rewarded with 1  ¢ for each 
correct response under 10 s,  and they were penalized 4¢ for every 
error and for every response slower than 10 s. 
At the beginning of each trial, the subject sat facing the visual 
display with his or her left index finger resting on a  button labeled 
"ready." This button was located on the extreme left of a four-button 
response panel. The subject's right index finger was on an unmarked 
button (the "home" button) located in the middle of the three-button 
cluster on the right side of the panel. To initiate a trial, the subject 
pressed the "ready" button. After the button was pressed, the period 
descriptions appeared on the screen, and a string of Xs appeared two 
lines above the period on the left. Subjects were instructed to read 
the period descriptions and to make sure that they knew which period 
was located on which side of the screen. Then they were to shift their 
gaze to the string of Xs. After 1.5 s, the Xs were erased and replaced 
by the target event. 
When the event appeared,  subjects were to read the description 
and decide whether the event happened during the period on the left 
side of the screen or during the period on the right. Subjects pressed 
a  button labeled "L" to  indicate that they thought that the event 
happened during the period on the left, and they pressed a  button 
labeled "R" to indicate that they thought the event had occurred 
during the period on the right. The "L" button was located immedi- 
ately to the left of the "home" button, and the "R" button immedi- 
ately to the right. Subjects made all responses with their right index 
finger and returned their finger to "home" position after each trial. 
After each response, the screen was erased until the subject initiated 
the next trial. 
After every 20 trials, subjects received a message telling them the 
number of errors they had made in the preceding set of trials and the 
average reaction time for their correct responses. The message also 
informed subjects of the amount of bonus money they had earned in 
the last 20 trials and the total amount of bonus money accumulated 
to that point. The feedback message appeared on the screen for 10 s 
and then was replaced by a  message telling the subject to continue 
the experiment. 
Before the experiment began, subjects received 40 practice trials. 
The procedure on each practice trial was identical to the one just 
described except that the phrases old period and new period served as 
the period descriptions,  and the phrases old event and new event 
served as event descriptions.  Subjects were instructed to press the 
button corresponding to old period when the phrase old event ap- 
peared and to press the button for the new period when the phrase 
new event appeared. After the practice block, the experimenter pre- 
sented the subject with a  sheet of paper that listed the two periods 
that would appear during the first half of the experiment. After the 
second block, the experimenter returned to define the periods used 
in the last two blocks. 
At the end of the session, subjects received a rating form containing 
the 40  event descriptions,  listed 8  to  a  page,  in a  random order. 
Subjects indicated how much they knew about the events by rating 
each on a scale of 0 (no knowledge of  an event) to 9 (a great deal of 
knowledge about it). 
Subjects.  The 24  subjects who participated in this experiment 
were 4th-year undergraduates at the University of Chicago. All sub- 
jects had entered college in the fall of 1980, and none had served as 
subjects in previous current-event experiments. Subjects received $4 
as the base pay for the 45-min session and whatever bonus money 
they earned. 
Results 
Figure 2 presents mean correct reaction times (RTs) for the 
first half (Blocks 1 and 2) and second half (Blocks 3 and 4) of 
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Figure 2.  Mean correct reaction time as a  function of period type 
and event type, for the first half(Blocks 1 and 2) and second half of 
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this experiment. The data displayed in this figure suggest that 
subjects altered their strategies as they progressed from the 
first half to the second. In particular, it seems that subjects 
realized the extent of the temporal overlap between the two 
sets of periods soon after they began the second half. Having 
realized this, they would have been able to respond by recall- 
ing their earlier responses, thereby avoiding more complicated 
strategies.  For this reason,  data  from the  two  halves were 
analyzed separately. Mean correct RT and mean error rate 
were computed for each combination of  event type and period 
type for each half. In the subjects ANOVAS,  the subjects variable 
was nested within period type, and in the item ANOVAs, the 
events variable was nested within event type. 
Data from the first half of  this experiment provided support 
for the two predictions made earlier:  RTs in  nonpolitical- 
personal trials (2,330  ms) were  187  ms faster than RTs in 
political-personal trials  (2,517  ms),  and  RTs  in  political- 
public  trials  (2,410  ms)  were  140  ms  faster than  RTs  in 
nonpolitical-public  trials  (2,550  ms).  This  Event  Type  x 
Period Type interaction was significant by subjects, F(1, 22) 
= 9.7, p <  .01, and by items, F(1, 38) = 4.6, p <  .05, whereas 
neither main effect was significant in either analysis (Fs <  l 
in all cases).  The interaction between event type and period 
type disappeared in the second half (Fs <  l  for subjects and 
items). Indeed, the only significant result was a  main effect 
for period type in the items analysis, F(l,  38) =  14.4, p  < 
.01--for subjects, F(1, 22) =  2.1, p  >  .01--which indicated 
that  subjects  who  received the  public  periods  (1,859  ms) 
during the second half responded faster than those who re- 
ceived personal periods (2,011  ms). However, the fact that 
public periods (23%) resulted in more errors than did personal 
periods ( 19 %)--for items, F( l, 38) = 5.0, p <  .05; for subjects, 
F  <  l-- suggests  that subjects in the two groups may have 
had  slightly different response criteria.  Although  the  error 
rates were fairly high in this experiment (22% for the first half 
and 20% for the second half), only the main effect of period 
type just reported reached significance. Finally, the knowledge 
ratings for political events (5.77) did not differ significantly 
from the knowledge ratings for nonpolitical events (5.29). 
Discussion 
Subjects in this experiment found political-public trials to 
be easier than nonpolitical-public trials, and they found non- 
political-personal trials to be easier than political-personal 
trials. The first result provides converging evidence for the 
contention that political events are more likely to be related 
to  historical  (presidential)  periods  than  are  nonpolitical 
events.  This  is consistent  with  the  notion  that  an  event's 
content determines whether it will be related to a particular 
historical period. The second result indicates that retrievable 
contextual information is more readily available for nonpo- 
litical events than for political events. 
Earlier studies of news comprehension indicate that people 
recall  nonpolitical  or "human  interest"  stories better than 
other news stories (Findahl & Hoijer, 1985; Neuman,  1976). 
This finding suggests one reason for the differential availability 
of personal information.  Consider a  theory  of memory in 
which event knowledge at a particular time is a function of 
event age, rate of learning, and frequency of exposure. Also 
assume that repetition (i.e., frequency of exposure) leads to a 
decontextualization  or a  "semanticization" of the  repeated 
materials (Barclay, 1986; Barclay & Wellman, 1986; Linton, 
1982). In Experiments 1 and 2, event knowledge and event 
age  were  held  constant  across  event  type.  As  mentioned 
earlier, rate of learning appears to be greater for nonpolitical 
events than for political events. According to this theory, then, 
frequency of exposure would have to be greater for political 
events than for nonpolitical events. It follows from this con- 
clusion  and  the  assumed  relation  between  frequency  and 
decontextualization that facts about political events should be 
decontextualized to a greater extent than facts about nonpo- 
litical events. In other words, if event age and level of knowl- 
edge are held constant, people should have more contextual 
information available for nonpolitical events than for political 
events because they learn about the former faster than they 
learn about the latter. 
Experiment 3 
In the interpretation of the protocols collected in Experi- 
ment 1, it was assumed that an opportunistic retrieval process 
supported date reconstruction; that is,  it was assumed that 
subjects did not search memory for specific facts but, rather, 
that they retrieved and evaluated those facts that happened to 
be most readily available,  regardless of their content.  This 
retrieval assumption seems reasonable, given the scarcity of 
explicit calendar dates in long-term memory and the abun- 
dance of other sorts of potentially useful information; how- 
ever, it might be too strong.  It could be that the  subjects 
focused their search and retrieved only pertinent information, 
or it could be that they retrieved information in an opportun- 
istic  manner  and then  screened each  retrieved fact before 
submitting it to the  inference process. The possibility that 
subjects employed one of these alternative retrieval strategies 
does not seriously undermine the conclusions concerning the 
relative availability of presidential and personal facts because 
both types of facts are inherently temporally informative. This 
means that contextual and presidential information should 
have been retrieved and evaluated regardless of whether the 
subjects limited their search to temporally informative facts 
or chose to evaluate only those retrieved facts that seemed 
relevant. 
Although plausible  modifications to the retrieval process 
do not affect conclusions concerning personal and presidential 
information, they do suggest  a second interpretation for the 
finding that  subjects retrieved more  same-narrative events 
than nonnarrative events in Experiment  I. This result was 
taken as evidence that the strongest interevent associations 
tend to be between events belonging to the same narrative. 
However, the predominance of same-narrative responses may 
simply reflect the fact that same-narrative events are more 
likely to  be  causally linked  than  are  nonnarrative  events. 
Because causes precede consequences, the knowledge that a 
causal  relation holds between two  events at least provides 
relative temporal information. Thus it would make sense for 
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temporally  informative  facts  to  consider  same-narrative 
events and to ignore or reject nonnarrative events. 
Experiment 3--a free-association study--was designed to 
provide a  replication of this same-narrative advantage in a 
situation that de-emphasized temporal information.  In this 
experiment, subjects were presented with the descriptions of 
36 recent public events and were asked to write down the first 
public event that came to mind. If public events tend to be 
embedded in public narratives, and if the association between 
events embedded in the same narrative tend to be stronger 
than other sorts of interevent associations, then same-narra- 
tive events should be retrieved more often than should other 
sorts of events. 
A  second issue addressed in this study was the apparent 
relation  between  the  political nature  of an  event  and  the 
likelihood that it would be subsumed by a  public narrative. 
In Experiment  1, political events (32%) elicited more same- 
narrative responses than did nonpolitical events (9%).  This 
suggested that political events are more likely to be embedded 
in public narratives than nonpolitical events. There is, how- 
ever,  an  alternative explanation: This difference may have 
been a  by-product of the differential availability of personal 
information. According to this view, nonpolitical events are 
just as likely as political events to be embedded in narrative 
frameworks,  but  nonpolitical  events  are  more  likely than 
political events  to  be  associated with  retrievable  personal 
information. In this situation, competition from personal facts 
would be greater for nonpolitical events. Therefore, subjects 
should retrieve fewer of the available same-narrative events 
when dating nonpolitical events. 
In Experiment 3, as in Experiments 1 and 2, event type was 
manipulated; half of  the event descriptions referred to political 
events and the other half referred to nonpolitical events.  If 
political events are more likely to be embedded in narrative 
contexts than  nonpolitical events,  the  former  should  elicit 
more same-narrative responses than  the latter. However, if 
nonpolitical events are embedded in narrative structures as 
frequently as political events, event type should not influence 
the probability that subjects will respond with same-narrative 
events. 
Unlike the earlier experiments, event  knowledge was di- 
rectly manipulated in this study. This was done in order to 
demonstrate that the free-association task is sensitive to the 
availability of same-narrative events. The rationale for using 
event knowledge came from a  pilot study in which subjects 
were explicitly instructed to write down three same-narrative 
events for each of 36 public events.  This study produced a 
strong  correlation  between  event  knowledge  and  the  fre- 
quency  of  same-narrative  responses,  suggesting  that  well- 
known events are more likely to be embedded in narrative 
structures than obscure events. Hence if the current task were 
sensitive to the relative availability of narrative information, 
same-narrative responses would  be  more  common  for  the 
high-knowledge events than for low-knowledge events. 
Method 
Materials and design.  Thirty-six public events were selected for 
this experiment. Half of these were political events,  and half were 
nonpolitical events. Within each event type, half of  the items referred 
to  high-knowledge  events,  and  half  referred  to  low-knowledge 
events.The  assignment of event to level of knowledge was based on 
knowledge ratings collected from 20 pilot subjects a week before this 
experiment was conducted. In selecting items, objective age of event 
was balanced across the four cells of the design, and prior knowledge 
was balanced across event type within level of knowledge.  On the 
average, the events had occurred a little more than a year before the 
time of the experiment (January 1984). (See Table 5.) 
Table 5 
Event Descriptions  in Experiment 3 
Date  Event 
April 1983 
September 1983 
October 1983 
October 1983 
October 1983 
February 1984 
July 1984 
October 1984 
November 1984 
Political high-knowledge events 
Harold Washington becomes mayor of Chi- 
cago. 
Soviets shoot down KAL Hight 007. 
241 U.S. soldiers die in Beirut truck bombing. 
U.S.  medical students evacuated from Gren- 
ada. 
Secretary of the Interior James Watt resigns. 
Jesse  Jackson's "hymie" remark reported in 
the press. 
Geraldine Ferraro nominated for Vice Presi- 
dent. 
Indira Gandhi assassinated. 
Western nations mount major Ethiopian relief 
effort. 
July 1982 
October 1982 
July 1983 
April 1984 
April 1984 
January 1984 
August 1984 
September 1984 
October 1984 
Political low-knowledge events 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigns. 
Helmut Kohl elected West German Chancel- 
lor. 
Polish government lifts martial law. 
Woman police officer killed outside of Libya's 
London embassy. 
President Reagan visits China. 
Kissinger Panel asks for $8 billion in aid for 
Central America. 
15 ships damaged by Red Sea mines. 
Shimon Peres becomes Israeli Prime Minister. 
President Duarte meets with Salvadoran rebel 
leaders. 
Nonpolitical high-knowledge events 
March 1982 
October 1982 
November 1983 
January 1984 
April 1984 
July 1984 
July 1984 
October 1984 
December 1984 
John Belushi dies. 
Seven people die in Tylenol poisonings. 
"The Day After" aired for first time. 
AT&T divested of local telephone companies. 
Marvin Gaye dies. 
Vanessa Williams loses Miss America title. 
Los Angeles Olympics begin. 
Chicago Cubs win the Eastern Division title. 
Over 2,000 die in Bhopal chemical disaster. 
Nonpolitical low-knowledge events 
September 1982 
September 1983 
November 1983 
December 1983 
July 1984 
August 1984 
September 1984 
October 1984 
November 1984 
Grace Kelly dies. 
Australia II wins the America's Cup. 
Rupert Murdoch buys the Chicago Sun Times. 
Three judges indicted in "Greylord" scandal. 
Alton Coleman captured in Evanston. 
Truman Capote dies. 
24 arrested in Jordan Minnesota child abuse 
FBI agent Richard Miller arrested for spying. 
Margie Velma Barfield executed in North Car- 
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Procedure.  Each experimental session was divided into two parts: 
a  free-association  phase and a knowledge-assessment  phase. Half of 
the subjects performed the free-association  task first and the knowl- 
edge-assessment task second, and half of  the subjects performed these 
tasks in the opposite order. Although subjects knew that they would 
be required to perform two tasks, they were  not informed of the 
nature of the second task until they had completed the first. Subjects 
were tested individually  and were randomly assigned to a task order. 
During the free-association phase, each subject was presented with 
a booklet in which the 36 event descriptions were listed in a unique 
random order, 9 to the page. Under each description was a line for 
the subject's response. Subjects were instructed to write down the first 
current event (other than the target event) that came to mind. They 
were also told that they should not write down a retrieved event if it 
had already served as a  target event,  if it already had  served as 
response, or if it was a "historical event" (i.e., if it happened before 
the subject was born). Moreover, they were instructed not to write 
down autobiographical  events, additional  details  concerning the target 
event, or paraphrases of the event description. Finally, subjects were 
asked to work through the events in the order they appeared and not 
to return to an item once they had gone on to another. 
The knowledge rating forms were identical to the free-association 
forms, except that the work knowledge  was printed underneath each 
target event. During this phase, subjects were instructed to write down 
the number of facts that they could recall about each event. 
Subjects.  The 30 subjects who participated in this study were all 
University of  Chicago undergraduate and graduate students recruited 
through an advertisement in the university paper. None of these 
subjects had participated  in previous current-events experiments, and 
each was paid $4 for a session lasting approximately 45 min. 
Results 
Knowledge  ratings.  A  mean knowledge rating was com- 
puted for each  event over all subjects.  These event means 
correlated highly (.84, p  <  .001) with the knowledge ratings 
used to assign events to knowledge level. Because the ratings 
for all of the  high-knowledge events  were  higher than  the 
ratings for all of the low-knowledge events, it was not neces- 
sary to reassign events to knowledge level. 
In order to analyze the effect of the experimental factors 
on the knowledge ratings, two ANOVAS were performed. For 
the  subjects  analysis,  responses  were  averaged  over  items 
within  each  of the  four cells of the  design.  For the  items 
analysis, responses were averaged over subjects within a task 
order. The means were submitted to ANOVAS  in which event 
type, level of  knowledge, and task order served as fixed effects, 
and  subjects or items served as random  effects. The  mean 
knowledge  ratings  were  5.45  for  high-knowledge  political 
events, 4.97 for high-knowledge nonpolitical events, 2.54 for 
low-knowledge political events, and 2.42  for low-knowledge 
nonpolitical events. Subjects rated their knowledge of  political 
events (4.00) slightly higher than their knowledge of nonpo- 
litical events (3.69; min F' <  1), and the "rate-first" subjects 
(3.90)  scored their knowledge slightly greater than  did the 
"associate-first" subjects (3.79; Fs <  1 for both subjects and 
items). However, only level of knowledge proved to be signif- 
icant. On average, subjects claimed to know more than twice 
as much about the high-knowledge events (5.21) as about the 
low-knowledge events (2.48), min F'(I, 54) =  36.4, p <  .001. 
Finally, none  of the  higher  order interactions  approached 
significance when  both items and subjects were taken into 
consideration. 
Free-association  responses.  Each  free-association  re- 
sponse was assigned to  one  and only one  of the following 
categories:  (a)  same-narrative,  (b)  same-activity,  (c)  both 
(same-narrative and same-activity), (d) thematic, (e) idiosyn- 
cratic, and (f) nonresponse. A response was considered to refer 
to a  same-narrative event when there was an obvious causal 
connection between the target event and the response, when 
the response referred to an event that was a  member of the 
target event's narrative even if there was no obvious causal 
connection between the two events, or when the response was 
one of the target event's subevents.  For example, narrative 
responses to the target event "241 marines die in Beirut truck 
bombing" included references to U.S. airstrikes against the 
Syrians in the Bekaa Valley (direct causal), the withdrawal of 
the Marines from  Beirut (indirect), and the search through 
the wreckage for survivors and bodies (subevents). 
Responses fell into the same-activity category when  they 
involved the same type of action as the target event.  This 
category  was  defined  broadly  so  that  events  of the  same 
general type as the target event were considered to be same- 
activity responses. For the Beirut truck bombing, events such 
as the bombing of Harrod's Department Store by the Irish 
Republican Army (a terrorist bombing) and the murder of 
four  soldiers in  San  Salvador (a  terrorist act that  did  not 
involve a bomb) were considered to be same-activity  response. 
An item was considered to be a "both" response when it met 
the  criteria for the  same-narrative category and  the  same- 
activity category. For example, a "both" response to the truck 
bombing of the Marine base in Beirut was the truck bombing 
of the U.S. embassy in Beirut a year later. 
A  response was considered to be thematically related to a 
target event when the two events were similar in some obvious 
way but were not members of the same narrative or examples 
of the same action category. In general, a thematic response 
overlapped with  the  target  event  because  the  two  events 
involved the same participant, took place in the same country 
or geographical region, or shared a  common topic. For ex- 
ample,  the  response  "Capote  writes  In  Cold  Blood"  was 
considered  to  be  thematically related  to  the  target  event 
"Truman Capote dies" because both events concerned Tru- 
man Capote. When there was no obvious connection between 
a  response and the target event that elicited it, the response 
was considered to be idiosyncratic. For example, one subject 
gave the response "Cuomo  defeats Lehrman  as New York 
State  governor"  to  the  target  event  "Seven  people  die  in 
Tylenol  poisonings."  Finally,  "nonresponses"  were  coded 
when subjects failed to write down an event in response to a 
target  event.  As  a  check  on  the  reliability of this  coding 
scheme, a  second judge coded 20%  of the responses (6  re- 
sponses chosen  at  random  for each of 36  items).  The two 
judges agreed 94% of the time on the codings. 
Three  predictions concerning the  outcome  of this  study 
were made: First, same-narrative responses would be more 
common than any other type of response; second, political 
events would elicit more same-narrative responses than non- 
political events; and third, high-knowledge events would elicit 
more  same-narrative responses than  would  low-knowledge 
events. Data relevant to these predictions can be  found in 310  NORMAN R.  BROWN 
Table 6. The entries in this table represent the proportion of 
responses that fell into each of the six response categories just 
described. 
Overall,  44%  of the  responses  were  same-narrative  re- 
sponses,  28%  same-activity,  and  18%  thematic,  whereas 
"both" responses, idiosyncratic responses, and nonresponses 
combined accounted for only I 1%  of data.  In order to test 
the prediction that same-narrative  responses would be pro- 
duced more often than any other type of response, a sign test 
was  performed.  In  this  test,  the  number  of subjects  who 
produced same-narrative  responses  more  often than  same- 
activity responses was compared with the number of subjects 
who produced more same-activity responses than same-nar- 
rative responses. The results of this test indicated that more 
subjects (19) fit the first pattern than fit the second (8; p  = 
.054, two-tailed). Three subjects responded equally often with 
both types of events. 
Because the last two predictions concerned same-narrative 
responses,  it was possible to perform  ANOVAS in which the 
proportion of same-narrative responses served as the depend- 
ent measure. In these analyses, event type, level of knowledge, 
and task order served as independent fixed effects, and sub- 
jects and items served as random effects. As predicted, polit- 
ical events (52%) elicited same-narrative responses more often 
than  did  nonpolitical  events (35%),  min  F'(1,  43)  =  5.26, 
p  <  .05,  and  high-knowledge events  (52%)  elicited  same- 
narrative responses more often than did low-knowledge events 
(35%), min F'(1, 41) =  5.43, p <  .05. These two main effects 
reflect the fact that subjects retrieved far fewer same-narrative 
events when responding to low-knowledge nonpolitical events 
(20%)  than  when  responding  to  low-knowledge  political 
events (50%), high-knowledge political events (54%), or high- 
knowledge  nonpolitical  events  (50%).  This  Event  Type  x 
Level of Knowledge interaction was significant for subjects, 
F(I, 28) =  24.4, p <  .01, and marginally significant for items, 
F(I, 32) =  3.7, .05 < p <. 10. Finally, task order had no effect 
on the probability that subjects would retrieve same-narrative 
events (Fs <  1, by subjects and by items), nor did it interact 
with the other factors. 
Discussion 
Subjects in this  experiment  were  more likely to respond 
with same-narrative events than with any other type of event, 
and they were more likely to provide same-narrative events 
in response to political events and high-knowledge nonpolit- 
ical events than  in response  to low-knowledge nonpolitical 
events. Assuming that the events selected as responses were 
strongly associated with the target events, these results imply 
that public events are often stored with other causally related 
events and that some types of events (low-knowledge nonpo- 
litical events) are less likely than others to be embedded in a 
narrative framework. 
Given the prior expectations concerning event type, knowl- 
edge, and narrative availability, the finding that low-knowl- 
edge political events elicited almost as many same-narrative 
responses as did the high-knowledge events came as a surprise. 
One explanation  for this  finding is  that  many of the  low- 
knowledge political items often appear to have been minor 
episodes embedded in large, complex narratives. Thus when 
a  subject accessed the representation  of one of these minor 
events, a number of major events from the target's narrative 
may have been present for consideration.  For example,  the 
low-knowledge event "Polish government lifts martial  law" 
was clearly part of the Solidarity narrative,  which had been 
going on for a number of years and had involved a number 
of well-publicized events, including the riots in Gdansk,  the 
formation of the Solidarity movement, Lech Walesa's impris- 
onment,  his  release,  and  his  Nobel  Prize.  Although  these 
events  may or  may not  have  been  directly (i.e.,  causally) 
related to the target event, they were events that subjects were 
likely to know about and might recall when considering the 
situation  in  Poland  in  a  general  way.  In  contrast  to  low- 
knowledge political events, low-knowledge nonpolitical events 
often seem to exist in isolation. For example, one may be well 
aware that Truman Capote died and still  be ignorant of the 
circumstances  surrounding  his  death.  This  does  not  imply 
that such events do not have causes or consequences; clearly 
they do.  However, it does suggest that the public  probably 
had  little  opportunity to  learn  about  these  events  or little 
interest in doing so. 
These observations suggest that the representation of public 
narratives  in  memory differ  in  complexity  and  that  these 
differences mirror the structure of events in the world, at least 
to the extent that this structure is captured by the news media. 
At one end of the complexity continuum are isolated events, 
such as the death of Truman Capote. People may recognize 
such events  and  may even  know  a  few facts about  them. 
However, they are considered isolated because the public has 
little awareness of their causes or consequences. At the op- 
Table 6 
Proportion of  Responses  for Each Event Type in Experiment 3 
Response type 
Same  Same 
Event type  narrative  activity  Both  Thematic  Idiosyncratic  Nonresponses 
Polific~ 
High  .54  .26  .02  .11  .05  .01 
Low  .50  .24  .02  .14  .08  .01 
Nonpolitic~ 
High  .50  .22  .00  .21  .02  .03 
Low  .20  .38  .01  .24  .04  .11 
M  .44  .28  .01  .18  .05  .04 ORGANIZATION  OF PUBLIC EVENTS  311 
posite end of the continuum are multiepisode narratives such 
as the U.S. involvement in Lebanon, the Aquino revolution 
in the Philippines, and the Iran-contra affair. These narratives 
organize a number of major and minor events that may be 
causally and hierarchically interrelated in complex ways. Be- 
tween  the  two  extremes  are focal-event  narratives,  which 
center on a single well.publicized event, such as the Tylenol 
poisonings or the death of John Belushi. What distinguishes 
narratives of this  sort  from isolated events  is  that  people 
generally have knowledge of some of the minor events that 
caused or resulted from the narrative's central event. These 
distinctions can be mapped on to the design of Experiment 3 
in the following way, Political events, regardless of level of 
knowledge, tended to be drawn from multiepisode narratives; 
high-knowledge political events are distinguished from low- 
knowledge political events by their importance. In contrast, 
high-knowledge nonpolitical items seemed to refer to the main 
event in a particular focal-event narrative, and low-knowledge 
nonpolitical items tended to refer to isolated events. 
This does not imply that political events must be subsumed 
by multiepisode  narratives or that  nonpolitical  events can 
never be embedded in such narratives. Such assertions would 
clearly be too strong. After all, some political events do stand 
in relative isolation (e.g., Reagan's visit to the Bitburg Ceme- 
tery),  and  some  nonpolitical  events  do  initiate  chains  of 
memorable follow-up events (e.g.,  Ivan Boesky's indictment 
for insider trading). Yet the existence of a  relation between 
event type and narrative complexity seems more than coin- 
cidental. In particular, the tendency for people to form mul- 
tiepisode political narratives can be seen as a natural conse- 
quence of the structure of political, military, and diplomatic 
activities. As mentioned earlier, political events often describe 
the actions and reactions of  prominent human or institutional 
adversaries. The identifies of the adversaries and the nature 
of their conflicts tend to remain stable over long periods, and 
the course and resolution of these conflicts often have conse- 
quences that directly or indirectly affect a large percentage of 
the population. Conditions like these spawn a large number 
of related news stories, which in turn foster the development 
of multiepisode narrative representations. 
General Discussion 
To summarize, the primary aim of this  research was to 
identify the  structures that organize public events in  long- 
term  memory. To this  end,  an  organizational  model  was 
proposed,  and  its  implications  were  investigated  in  three 
experiments. Experiment  1 was a  protocol study in  which 
subjects thought  aloud as they estimated dates for current 
events. These dating protocols provided data consistent with 
several aspects of  the proposed model. In particular, the results 
indicated (a) that associations between same-narrative events 
tend to be stronger than other sorts of interevent associations, 
(b) that accessible historical  periods exist but some public 
events (political events) are more likely to be related to these 
periods than others (nonpolitical events), and (c) that people 
frequently encode facts about public events along with infor- 
marion about the personal context in which those facts are 
encountered. The results also indicated (d) that nonpolitical 
events are more likely to be stored with retrievable personal 
information than  are political events and (e) that political 
events are more likely to be embedded in narrative contexts 
than nonpolitical events. Experiment 2 provided converging 
evidence for Co) and (d), and Experiment 3, for (a) and (e). 
Some methodological and substantive implications of these 
findings are discussed below. 
From a methodological perspective, this research is impor- 
tant because it demonsUates that verbal protocols can be used 
to probe the structure of complex real-word domains. It is 
clear in retrospect that the reports collected in Experiment 1 
were a rich and accurate source of structural data; not only 
did they provide evidence consistent with a proposed organi. 
zational model, but they also revealed verifiable distinctions 
that  had  not  been  anticipated.  Two  assumptions  allowed 
structural inferences to be drawn from the daring protocols. 
First, it was assumed that an opportunistic retrieval process 
drove date reconstruction.  Second, it was assumed that the 
organization of information in memory determined, at least 
in part, which facts would be most readily available and hence 
which facts would be retrieved and evaluated. Together, these 
assumptions implied that the content of the protocols would 
accurately reflect the organization of public events in long- 
term  memory.  Although  neither  assumption  was  directly 
tested, results obtained in Experiments 2 and 3 consistently 
supported the "accurate reflection" interpretations of the pro- 
tocol data and consistently failed to support interpretations 
that would have indicated the operation of a  more focused 
retrieval process. 
In general, the success of this research program suggests 
that the verbal protocols will provide useful structural infor- 
mation when the task being performed requires subjects to 
rely on an opportunistic retrieval process. Because opportun- 
istic retrieval plays a role in many real-world problem-solving 
situations (Collins, 1978; Collins & Michalski, 1989; Kintsch, 
1988; Nickerson,  t980; Norman & Bobrow, 1979; Williams 
&  Hollan,  198 l), the protocol technique  should be widely 
applicable. Data provided by date-estimation tasks could cer- 
tainly lead to a better understanding of the organization of 
noncontemporary history (N. R. Brown & Siegler,  in press) 
and might help to resolve controversies in the autobiograph- 
ical memory literature (Barsalou, 1988; Conway & Bekerian, 
1987;  Reiser  et  al.,  1985).  Farther  afield,  one  might  use 
estimation  protocols  to  study  how  people  organize  their 
knowledge of  public figures, geography, commercial products, 
sports, or fine arts.  Again, the important point is that this 
approach can be used to generate an open-ended sample of 
domain-specific knowledge, and the contents of this sample 
can be taken as reflection of the domain's underlying organi- 
zation. 
The  date-estimation task used  in  Experiment  1 demon- 
strated one way in which the organization of information in 
memory and problem solving are related. In this task, memory 
structure affected the problem-solving  process by determining 
which of many potentially useful facts would be available for 
consideration  at  any  given  moment.  This  was  important 
because the cycle of retrieval and inference that allows date 
reconstruction may halt before all relevant information has 
been examined. As a  result, the availability of information 312  NORMAN R.  BROWN 
(which is conditioned by the structure of the relevant facts) 
may dictate the ultimate solution to a problem, as well as the 
sequence of inferences that constitute the path to that solu- 
tion. 
Beyond its impact on problem solving, memory structure 
is important because it affects recall. Research in story com- 
prehension indicates that events with many causal links are 
better recalled than those with few (Trabasso & van den Brock, 
1985),  that  events  on  a  story's  "causal  chain"  are  better 
remembered than those not on the chain (Black & Bern, 1981; 
Black & Bower, 1980; Omanson, 1982; Trabasso et al., 1984; 
Trabasso &  van den  Brock,  1985),  and that well-structured 
stories (i.e., stories with  high proportions of events on  the 
causal chain) are better recalled than poorly structured stories 
(Trabasso et al., 1984). Given the importance of narrativelike 
representations in  historical memory,  it is likely that  such 
structural  variables have  a  powerful  impact  on  how  well 
people  remember  public  events.  Thus,  other  things  being 
equal,  a  news  event  with  many  causes  and  consequences 
should be better recalled than one with few; events that are 
on a public narrative's causal chain should be better recalled 
than  those that  are  not;  and  public narratives that  have  a 
simple structure should be better recalled than those that have 
a  more convoluted structure.  Moreover,  to the  extent that 
autobiographical memory is organized in a narrative manner, 
similar structural factors should affect the  memorability of 
personal events. 
One final point concerns the political-nonpolitical  distinc- 
tion  that  has  figured  so  prominently  in  this  article.  This 
distinction was introduced in order to demonstrate that an 
event's  content,  as  well  as  its  age,  determines  whether  it 
belongs to  a  particular historical period.  The  research  de- 
scribed  above  indicated that  this  hypothesis  is  essentially 
correct. It also indicated that the political nature of an event 
is related to the likelihood that it would be stored with readily 
available contextual information and to the likelihood that it 
would be embedded in a narrative context. The difference in 
contextual availability  was attributed to differences in the ease 
of learning, and  the difference in  the  availability of same- 
narrative responses was attributed to differences in narrative 
complexity. Although these  underlying variables appear to 
correlate with event type, it is clear that these correlations are 
not perfect. After all, some political events are readily under- 
stood,  and  some  nonpolitical  narratives  are  composed  of 
many memorable events.  Thus  although the political-non- 
political distinction has been useful, future research will have 
to focus on the variables underlying the observed political- 
nonpolitical differences and  the  psychological mechanisms 
that make these variables important. 
References 
Anderson, J.  R. (1983).  The architecture  of cognition.  Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Baddeley, A. D., Lewis, V., & Nimmo-Smith, I. (1978).  When did 
you last...? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E.  Morris, & R. N. Sykes 
(Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp.  77-83). New York: Aca- 
demic Press. 
Barclay, C. R. (1986). Schematization of autobiographical memory. 
In D.  Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical  memory (pp. 82-99).  New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Barclay, C. R., & Wellman, H. M. (1986). Accuracies  and inaccuracies 
in autobiographical memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 
25, 93-103. 
Barsaiou,  L. W.  (1988).  The content and organization of autobio- 
graphical memory. In U. Neisser & E. Winograd (Eds.), Remem- 
bering reconsidered: Ecological and traditional  approaches to the 
study of  memory (pp.  193-243). New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Black, J. B., & Bern, H. (1981). Causal coherence and memory for 
events in narratives. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behav- 
ior, 20, 267-275. 
Black, J. B., & Bower, G. (1980).  Story understanding as problem 
solving. Poetics, 9, 223-250. 
Booth, A. (1970). The recall of news items. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
34, 604-610. 
Bradburn, N. M., Rips, L. J., & Shevell, S. IC (1987).  Answering 
autobiographical questions:  The impact of memory and inference 
on surveys. Science, 236, 158-161. 
Brown,  N. R., Rips, L. J., & SheveU, S. K. (1985). The subjective 
dates of natural  events  in  very  long term  memory.  Cognitive 
Psychology, 17, 139-177. 
Brown, N. R., & Siegler, R. S. (in press). Subjective organization of 
U.S. presidents. American Journal of  Psychology. 
Brown,  R., & Kulik, J.  (1977). Flashbulb memories. Cognition,  5, 
73-99. 
Chi, M.  T.,  Glaser, R.,  &  Rees,  E.  (1982).  Expertise  in problem 
solving.  In R. J.  Sternberg  (Ed.), Advances  in the psychology  of 
human intelligence (Vol. 1, pp. 7-75). Hillsdale, N  J: Erlbaum. 
Clifton,  C., Jr., & Slowiaczek, M. L. (1981). Integrating new infor- 
mation with old knowledge. Memory & Cognition, 9,  142-148. 
Collins,  A. M.  (1978).  Fragments of a  theory of human plausible 
reasoning. In D. Waltz (Ed.), Theoretical issues in naturallanguage 
processing--2 (pp.  194-201). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading activation theory 
of semantic processing. Psychological Review, 82, 407-428. 
Collins, A. M., & Michalski, R. (1989). The logic of plansible reason- 
ing: A core theory. Cognitive Science, 13, i--49. 
Combs, B., & Slovic, P. (1979). Causes of death: Biased newspaper 
coverage and biased judgments. Journalism Quarterly,  56,  837- 
843, 848. 
Conway, M. A., & Bekerian, D. A. (1987). Organization in autobio- 
graphical memory. Memory & Cognition, 15, 119-132. 
Ericsson,  K.  A., &  Simon, H.  A. (1980).  Verbal  reports as data. 
Psychological Review, 87, 215-251. 
Ferguson, R. P., & Martin, P. (1983). Long-term temporal estimation 
in humans. Perception & Psychophysics, 33, 585-592. 
Findahl, O., & Hoijer, B. (1975). Effects of additional verbal infor- 
mation on retention of a radio news program. Journalism  Quar- 
terly, 52, 493-498. 
Findahl, O., & Hoijer, B. (1982). The problem of comprehension and 
recall of broadcast news.  In J.  F. LeNey & W. Kintsch (Eds.), 
Language  and comprehension  (pp. 261-272). Amsterdam: North- 
Holland. 
Findahl, O., & Hoijer, B. (1985). Some characteristics of  news memory 
and comprehension.  Unpublished manuscript, Audience and Pro- 
gramme Research Department, Swedish Broadcasting  Corporation, 
Stockholm. 
Fitzgerald, J. M. (1980). Sampling autobiographical memory reports 
in adolescents. Developmental Psychology, 6, 675-676. 
Friedman, W. J. (1987). A follow-up to "Scale Effects in Memory for ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC  EVENTS  313 
Time of Events": The earthquake study. Memory & Cognition, 15, 
518-520. 
Friedman, W. J., & Wilkins, A. J. (1985). Scale effects in memory 
for time of events. Memory & Cognition, 13, 168-175. 
Gaziano, C.  (1983). The knowledge gap: An analytical  review of 
media effects. Communication  Research, 10, 447--486. 
Graber,  D. A. (1984), Processing the news: How people  tame the 
information tide. New York: Longraan. 
Graesser, A. C., Robertson, S. P., & Anderson, P. A. (1981). Incor- 
porating inferences in narrative representations: A study of how 
and why. Cognitive Psychology, 13. 1-26. 
Hastie, R., & Kumar, P. A. (1979). Person memory: Personality traits 
as organizing principles in memory for behaviors. Journal of  Per- 
sonality and Social Psychology, 37, 25-38, 
Hutteniocher,  J.,  Hedges, L.,  & Bradburn,  N.  (1990). Reports  of 
elapsed time:  Bounding and rounding processes in estimation. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,  & Cog- 
nition, 16, 196-213. 
Huttenloeher,  J.,  Hedges, L., & Prohaska, V. (t988).  Hierarchical 
organization  of ordered  domains: Estimation dates  for  events. 
Psychological Review, 95, 471--484. 
Iyengar, S., & Kinder,  D.  R.  (1987). News that  matters.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Iyengar, S., Peters, M. D., & Kinder, D.  R. (1982). Experimental 
demonstrations  of  the "not-so-minimal"  consequences of  television 
news programs. American Poh'tical Science Review, 76, 848-858. 
Johnson, J. H., & Klingler, D. E. (1976). A questionnaire  technique 
for  measurement of episodic  long-term  memory.  Psychological 
Reports, 39, 291-298. 
Kintsch, W. (1988). The role of knowledge in discourse comprehen- 
sion: A construction-integration  model. Psychological Review, 95, 
163-182. 
Kolodner, J. L  (1983a). Maintaining  organization in a dynamic  long- 
term memory. Cognitive Science, 7, 243-280. 
Kolodner, J. L. (1983b). Reconstructive memory: A computer model. 
Cognitive Science, 7, 281-328. 
Larsen, S.  F. (1983). Text  processing and knowledge updating in 
memory for radio news. Discourse Processes, 6, 21-38. 
Lebowitz, M. (1983a). Generalization from  natural language text. 
Cognitive Science, 7. 1-40. 
Lebowitz, M. (1983b). Memory-based parsing. Artificial Intelligence, 
21, 363-404. 
Lewis-Becker, M. S., & Rice, T. W. (1982). Presidential popularity 
and presidential vote. Public Opinion Quarterly, 46, 534-537. 
Lieury, A., Aiello, B., Lepreux, D., & MeUet, M. (1980). Le role des 
reperes dans la recuperation et al datation des souvenirs [The role 
of reference points in the recall and dating of memories]. L'annee 
Psychologique, 80, 149-167. 
Linton, M. (1975). Memory for real-world events. In D. A. Norman 
& D, E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Explorations in cognition (pp. 376-404). 
San Francisco: Freedman. 
Linton, M. (1982). Transformations  of memory in everyday life. In 
U. Neisser (Ed.), Memory observed: Remembering in natural con- 
texts (pp. 77-91). San Francisco: Freeman. 
Linton, M. (1986). Ways of searching and the contents of memory. 
In D.  Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical  memory (pp.  50-67).  New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Loftus, E. F., & Marburger, W. (1983). Since the eruption of Mt. St. 
Helens, has anyone beaten you up? Improving the accuracy of 
retrospective reports with landmark events. Memory & Cognition, 
11, 114-120. 
Mandler, J. M., & Johnson, N. S. (1977). Remembrance of things 
parsed: Story structure and recall. Cognitive Psychology, 9,  111- 
151. 
McCloskey, M., Wible, C. G., & Cohen,  N. J.  (1988). Is there  a 
special flashbulb-memory  mechanism? Journal  of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 117, 171-181. 
McCombs,  M. C.  (1981). The agenda-setting approach.  In D.  D. 
Nimmo & K. R. Sanders (Eds.), Handbook of  political communi- 
cation (pp. 121-140). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
McCombs, M. C., & Shaw, D. (1972). The agenda setting function 
of the mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36, 176-187. 
Means, B., Nigam, A., Zarrow, M., Loflus, E. F., & Donaldson, M. 
S.  (1989) Autobiographical  memory for  health-related  events 
(DHHS Pub. No. PHS 89-1077). Hyattsville, MD: National Center 
for Health Statistics. 
Neisser, U. (1982). Snapshots or benchmarks? In U. Neisser (Ed.), 
Memory observed: Remembering in natural contexts (pp. 43-48). 
San Francisco: Freeman. 
Neisser, U. (1986). Nested structure in autobiographical memory. In 
D. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 71-8 l). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Neuman, W.  R. (1976). Patterns  of recall among television news 
viewers. Public Opinion Quarterly, 40, 115-123. 
Nickerson, R,  (1980). Motivated  retrieval from  archival memory. 
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 28, 73-120. 
Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1979). Descriptions: An interme- 
diate stage in memory retrieval. Cognitive Psychology, 11,  107- 
123. 
O'Brien, E. J, & Myers, J. L. (1987). The role of cansal connection 
in the retrieval of text. Memory & Cognition, 15, 419-427. 
Oraanson,  R. C. (1982). The relation between centrality and story 
category variation. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behav. 
ior, 21, 326-337. 
Pennington,  N., & Hastie, R. (1986). Evidence evaluation  in complex 
decision making. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 
242-258. 
Pennington, N.,  &  Hastie,  R.  (1988). Explanation-based  decision 
making: Effects of memory structure on memory. Journal of Ex. 
perimental  Psychology: Learning,  Memory,  and  Cognition,  14, 
521-533. 
Pillemer, D. B. (1984). Flashbulb memories and the assassination 
attempt on President Reagan. Cognition, 16, 63-80. 
Raaijmakers, J. G., & Shiffrin, R. M. ( 1981). A theory of  probabilistic 
search of associative memory. Psychological Review, 88, 93-134. 
Reiser, B. J. (1983). Contexts and indices in autobiographical memory 
(Tech.  Rep.  24), New  Haven,  CT:  Yale  University,  Cognitive 
Science Program. 
Reiser, B.  J.,  Black, J.  B.,  &  Abelson, R.  P.  (1985). Knowledge 
structures  in the organization  and retrieval of autobiographical 
memory. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 89-137. 
Reiser, B. J., Black, J. B., & Kalarnarides, P. (1986). Strategic memory 
search processes. In D. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 
100-121). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Roberts, D. F., & Bachen, C. M. ( 1981). Mass communication  effects. 
Annual Review of  Psychology, 32, 307-356. 
Robinson, J. A. (1976). Sampling autobiographic~  memory. Cogni- 
tive Psychology, 8. 578-595. 
Robinson, J.  A. (1986). Temporal  reference systems and autobio- 
graphical memory.  In D. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory 
(pp. 159-188). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rubin, D. C. (1982). On the retention function for autobiographical 
memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 21- 
38. 
Rumelhart,  D. E. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In D. G. 
Bobrow & A. M. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: 
Studies  in cognitive science (pp. 211-236).  New York: Academic 
Press. 314  NORMAN  R.  BROWN 
Sehank, R. C. (1982). Dynamic memory: A theory of reminding and 
learning in computers and people. New York: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press. 
Schulz,  W.  F.  (1982).  News  structure and people's awareness of 
political events. Gazette, 30,  139-153. 
Schustack,  M. W., & Anderson, J. R. (1979).  Effects of analogy to 
prior knowledge on memory for new information.  JournalofVerbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 565-583. 
Sigelman, L. (1979).  Presidential popularity and presidential elec- 
tions. Public Opinion Quarterly, 43, 532-534. 
Srull, T. S.,  Lichtenstein, M.,  &  Rothbart,  M.  (1985).  Associative 
storage and retrieval process in person memory. Journal of  Exper- 
imental Psychology." Learning, Memory,  and Cognition, 11, 316- 
345. 
Srull, T. S., & Wyer, R. S. (1989).  Person memory and judgment. 
Psychological Review, 96, 58-83. 
Stein, N. L., & Glenn, C. G. (1979). An analysis of story comprehen- 
sion in elementary school children. In R. O. Freedle (Ed.), New 
directions in discourse processing (Vol. 2, pp. 53-120). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Thompson, C. P. (1982). Memory for unique personal events: The 
roommate study. Memory & Cognition, 10, 324-333. 
Thompson, C. P., Skowronski, J. J., & Lee, D. J. (1987). Reconstruct- 
ing the date of a personal event. Paper presented at the Second 
International  Conference of  Practical Aspects of Memory, Swansea, 
Wales. 
Tichenor, P. J., Donohue, G. A., & Olien, C. N. (1970). Mass media 
flow and differential growth of knowledge. Public Opinion Quar- 
terly, 34, 159-170. 
Trabasso, T., Secco, T., & van den Brock, P. (1984). Causal cohesion 
and story coherence. In H. Mandl, N. Stein, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), 
Learning and comprehension of text (pp. 83-111). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Trabasso, T., & Sperry,  L. L. (1985).  Causal relatedness and impor- 
tance of story events. Journal of  Memory and Language, 24, 595- 
612. 
Trabasso, T., & van den Brock,  P. (1985).  Causal thinking and the 
representation of narrative events. Journal  of Memory and Lan- 
guage, 24, 612-630. 
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of  episodic memory. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Underwood, B. J. (1977).  Temporal codes in memory. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbanm. 
van den Brock,  P., & Trabasso, T. (1986).  Causal networks versus 
goal hierarchies in summarizing  text. Discourse Processes, 9, 1-15. 
van Dijk, T. A. (1984). Structures of  international news: A case study 
of the world's press. Unpublished manuscript, University of Am- 
sterdam,  Department of Literary  Studies,  Section of Discourse 
Studies. 
van Dijk,  T.  A.,  &  Kintsch, W.  (1983).  Strategies  of discourse 
comprehension. New York: Academic Press. 
Voss,  J.  F.,  Greene, T.  R.,  Post,  T. A., &  Penner, B.  C.  (1983). 
Problem-solving skill in the social sciences.  In G.  Bower (Eds., 
Psychology of Learning  and Motivation  (Vol.  17, pp.  165-213). 
New York: Academic Press. 
Wagenaar, W. A. (1986). My memory: A study of autobiographical 
memory over six years. Cognitive Psychology, 18, 225-252. 
Warrington, E. K., & Sanders, H. I. (1971). The fate of old memories. 
Quarterly Journal of  Experimental Psychology, 23, 432--442. 
Wartington, E. K., & Silberstein, M. (1970).  A questionnaire tech- 
nique for investigating very long term memory. Quarterly Journal 
of  Experimental  Psychology, 22, 508-512. 
Williams, M.  D., &  Hollan, J.  D. (1981).  The process  of retrieval 
from very-long term memory. Cognitive Science. 5, 87-119. 
Winograd, E.,  & Killinger, W. (1983).  Relating age at encoding in 
early childhood to adult recall: Development of flashbulb memo- 
ties. Journal of  Experimental Psychology." General, 112, 413-422. 
Wyer, R. S., Shoben, E. J., Fuhrman, R. W., & Bodenhausen, G. V. 
(1985). Event memory: The temporal organization of social action 
sequences. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 857- 
877. 
Yarmey, A. D., & Bull, M.  P., III (1978).  Where were you when 
President Kennedy was assassinated? Bulletin of the Psychonomic 
Society, 11,  133-135. 
Received July 31,  1989 
Accepted March  12,  1990  m 